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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Individuals who file for personal bankruptcy according to Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code 
can generally retain some assets. Specifically, at the state level there tend to be exemptions 
for  certain  asset  classes  up  to  specific  thresholds.  The  main  exemption  is  the  homestead 
exemption,  which  enables  the  filer  to  retain  home  equity  in  his  primary  residence 
(“homestead”) up to the exemption amount. The homestead exemption ranges from $0 in 
Maryland to an unlimited amount in eight US states, including Florida and Texas, in 2006. 
Personal bankruptcy is quite common in the US, with about one million Chapter 7 filings in 
2009, and homestead exemptions therefore frequently apply. With a home ownership rate of 
about  67%  in  the  US  in  2009,  the  homestead  exemption  significantly  affects  the  financial 
position of households that emerge from personal bankruptcy, especially in high exemption 
states.  
 
This  paper  provides  an  empirical  and  a  theoretical  investigation  of  the  impact  of  the 
homestead exemption  on household portfolio  allocation, and  in particular on the share  of 
home equity in net worth and on home ownership. We present a two-period model of the 
allocation of wealth between home equity and another asset category in the presence of a 
homestead  exemption  and  major  expense  risk.  This  expense  risk  takes  the  form  of  an 
uninsurable  medical  expense,  although  it  can  easily  be  reinterpreted  as  any  type  of 
uninsurable  income  or  other  economic  risk.  The  model  implies  that  marginal  household 
investment  in  home  equity  as  related  to  wealth  jumps  down  as  home  equity  reaches  the 
exemption level.  
 
The  estimation  uses  household  level  data  from  the  Survey  of  Income  and  Program 
Participation (SIPP) of the US Census Bureau. This data source provides information on wealth 
allocation  and  a  host  of  personal  and  household  characteristics  for  approximately  30,000 
households. The homestead exemption is found to have an economically significant effect on a 
household’s investment in home equity. Specifically, the percentage change in home equity as 
a share of the percentage change in wealth is estimated to be 24.3% higher if the household’s 
home equity is below the exemption rather than above it.  
 
The impact of the exemption level on home equity investment is estimated to be stronger for 
households with younger household heads, as these could face heightened income risk and a 
correspondingly higher probability of personal bankruptcy. A positive impact of the homestead 
exemption  on  home  equity  investment  is  confirmed  by  instrumental  variables  estimation 
where we use the historical exemption level in 1920 as an instrument for the more recent 
state-level exemption level. This choice of instrument is motivated by the fact that historical 
exemption levels are an important determinant of more recent exemption levels. We also estimate a Heckman two-stage selection model, where in the first stage households decide on 
home ownership. This approach yields a consistent impact of the homestead exemption on 
home equity investment. 
 
We, however, find only a weak relationship between the homestead exemption and home 
ownership.  In  probit  regressions,  in  particular,  we  fail  to  find  a  significant  impact  of  the 
homestead  exemption  on  home  ownership,  except  for  households  residing  in  states  with 
unlimited homestead exemptions.  
 
Our  results  imply  that  homestead  exemptions  distort  household  asset  portfolios  without 
bringing  about  clear  benefits  in  terms  of  increased  home  ownership,  questioning  the 
desirability of homestead exemptions.  
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1.  Introduction 
  Individuals who file for personal bankruptcy according to Chapter 7 of the US 
bankruptcy code can generally retain some assets. Specifically, at the state level there tend to be 
exemptions for certain asset classes up to specific thresholds. The main exemption is the 
homestead exemption, which enables the filer to retain home equity in his primary residence 
(“homestead”) up to the exemption amount.
1 
The homestead exemption ranges from $0 in Maryland to an unlimited amount in eight 
US states, including Florida and Texas, in 2006. Personal bankruptcy is quite common in the 
US, with about one million Chapter 7 filings in 2009, and homestead exemptions therefore 
frequently apply. With a home ownership rate of about 67% in the US in 2009
2, the homestead 
exemption significantly affects the financial position of households that emerge from personal 
bankruptcy, especially in high exemption states.  
The homestead exemption potentially affects household portfolio choice, because a 
household needs to have home equity to benefit from the wealth protection offered by the 
homestead bankruptcy exemption. This paper provides an empirical and a theoretical 
investigation of the impact of the homestead exemption on household portfolio allocation, and 
in particular on the share of home equity in net worth and on home ownership.  
The estimation uses household level data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) of the US Census Bureau. This data source provides information on wealth 
1 Homestead exemption laws generally also include an element of exemption from property taxes but our 
primary focus is on the bankruptcy protection that they offer.  
2 Computed as owner occupied housing units as a percent of the total number of occupied housing units using 
data from the Housing Vacancy Survey of the US Census Bureau.  
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allocation and a host of personal and household characteristics for approximately 30,000 
households. The homestead exemption is found to have an economically significant effect on a 
household’s investment in home equity. Specifically, the percentage change in home equity as a 
share of the percentage change in wealth is estimated to be 24.3% higher if the household’s 
home equity is below the exemption rather than above it.  
The impact of the exemption level on home equity investment is estimated to be 
stronger for households with younger household heads, as these could face heightened income 
risk and a correspondingly higher probability of personal bankruptcy. A positive impact of the 
homestead exemption on home equity investment is confirmed by instrumental variables 
estimation where we use the historical exemption level in 1920 as an instrument for the more 
recent state-level exemption level. This choice of instrument is motivated by the fact that 
historical exemption levels are an important determinant of more recent exemption levels. We 
also estimate a Heckman two-stage selection model, where in the first stage households decide 
on home ownership. This approach yields a consistent impact of the homestead exemption on 
home equity investment. 
We find only a weak relation between the homestead exemption and home ownership. 
In probit regressions, in particular, we fail to find a significant impact of the homestead 
exemption on home ownership, except for households residing in states with unlimited 
homestead exemptions. This could reflect that households wishing to purchase a home on 
account of a high risk of personal bankruptcy are thwarted by a lack of mortgage financing 
necessary to complete the purchase. Households that own a home instead are likely to have 
more leeway to adjust their home equity share to obtain the desired bankruptcy protection, as 
they can always pay down their existing mortgage. 
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  The empirical work is motivated by a two-period model of the allocation of wealth 
between home equity and another asset category in the presence of a homestead exemption and 
major expense risk. This expense risk takes the form of an uninsurable medical expense, 
although it can easily be reinterpreted as any type of uninsurable income or other economic 
risk. The model implies that marginal household investment in home equity as related to wealth 
jumps down as home equity reaches the exemption level. This is corroborated in the empirical 
work. 
  Personal bankruptcy, and the role of exemptions therein, have been the subject of 
several theoretical and empirical studies. In a world of incomplete contracting, Zame (1993) 
shows that contingent debt repayment, made possible by bankruptcy, can be welfare improving. 
The consumer will declare bankruptcy in states of nature with low income or high expenses, 
providing some consumption insurance across states of nature. Such insurance comes at a cost 
of a more limited ability to borrow, and hence a reduced ability to smooth consumption over 
time. Livshits et al. (2007) calibrate a heterogeneous life-cycle model with US data to 
investigate whether the ability to declare personal bankruptcy, followed by a period of 
exclusion from new borrowing, improves welfare compared to a system where a “fresh start” is 
not possible. Their calculations suggest that a bankruptcy system that offers a fresh start is 
welfare improving for the case where expense shocks are explicitly modeled. Athreya (2002) 
instead finds that the possibility of consumer bankruptcy reduces welfare in a quantitative 
analysis of the effects of bankruptcy laws in an incomplete market exchange economy.  
  Homestead exemptions allow households to emerge from bankruptcy with positive net 
worth. The effect of these exemptions should be to further insure households against untoward 
income and expense shocks, and to also further limit their ability to borrow and to smooth 
  4    
consumption intertemporally. Li and Sarte (2006) analyze the implications of exemptions for 
welfare in a general equilibrium model with endogenous capital formation and labor supply. In 
a model calibrated with US data, they find that lowering the level of exemptions increases 
output and is welfare improving.
3  
  Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) empirically investigate how exemptions affect 
aggregate credit to households. They argue that the protection offered by exemptions increases 
household demand for credit, while it reduces the supply of credit. They find that the net impact 
on credit is negative for less-well-off households, but it is positive for high-asset households.
4  
Bankruptcy protection potentially makes owning a business with unlimited liability less risky. 
Fan and White (2002) find that the probability that a household owns a small business is higher 
in states with unlimited exemption than in other states. Fay et al. (2002) examine how 
bankruptcy exemptions affect the household bankruptcy decision, and they find that the 
financial gain that households can attain by filing for bankruptcy, as affected by the 
exemptions, is a main determinant of the bankruptcy decision.   
  There is also related literature on the determinants of home ownership. Li (1977) relates 
home ownership to household characteristics such as the age of the household head, income 
3 Lower exemptions are found to reduce the incentive to save for borrowers, leading to higher lending rates, 
which reduces the amount of debt and stimulates capital formation. With higher lending rates, fewer households 
will opt for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, thereby increasing the labor supply, output and welfare.   
4 Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) find that homestead exemptions tend to reduce the probability of being denied 
secured mortgage credit. Berkowitz and White (2004), instead, find that unincorporated businesses are more 
likely to be denied unsecured credit or to receive less credit at higher interest rates, if they are located in states 
with unlimited rather than low homestead exemptions. Berger et al. (2008) construct a measure of bankruptcy 
protection that reflects the extent to which a business owner’s home equity is covered by the homestead 
protection, and find that larger home equity protection leads to less and costlier credit to small businesses with 
unlimited liability. 
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and family size. Using micro-level data from 14 OECD countries, Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) 
find that the availability of mortgage finance – as measured by down payment ratios – affects 
owner occupancy rates especially for young households. King and Leape (1998) jointly 
consider the home ownership decision and the resulting household portfolio share in a general 
study of household portfolio allocation of US households and find that both home ownership 
and investment in owner-occupied housing respond positively to increases in wealth.  
  Recent work on housing and portfolio composition has recognized that housing is 
special because it is an asset as well as a durable consumption good, and because adjustments 
to housing wealth imply large transactions costs.  Flavin and Yamashita (2002) consider the 
optimal household portfolio under the assumption that the household is constrained to live in 
the house that is owns and show that this implies that housing introduces considerable portfolio 
risk, especially for younger households with low net worth. Cocco (2005) provides empirical 
evidence that house price risk crowds out stockholdings, and that this crowding out is stronger 
for households with low net worth. Using data from the SIPP survey, Chetty and Szeidl (2009) 
find that increases in household home equity, as explained by higher state-level house price 
indices, lead to a larger share of stocks in liquid wealth. Also using SIPP data, Corradin et al. 
(2010) estimate a model of optimal housing wealth adjustment where house price movements 
are predictable and there are housing adjustment costs. These authors find empirical support for 
the existence of a region of inaction for values of the housing share in net worth, for which the 
household optimally does not adjust his housing wealth up or down.  
  Homestead bankruptcy exemptions also set investments in home equity apart from other 
investments. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the empirical impact of 
homestead exemptions on the home equity share in net worth and on home ownership. 
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Homestead exemptions are found to provide bankruptcy protection especially to households 
that can be expected to need this, such as households that report poor health and low wealth. 
This protection, however, comes at a cost of biasing household portfolios towards real estate. 
This distortion comes in the form of higher home equity shares in net worth for home owners.  
Our findings inform the policy debate about the desirability of homestead exemptions, and 
contribute to the literature on the effect of personal bankruptcy on household portfolio choice. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role and 
evolution of exemptions in the US system of personal bankruptcy. Section 3 presents a simple 
two-period model of optimal investment in home equity in a world with bankruptcy exemption 
and major expense risk. Section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 presents the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The role of exemption in US  personal bankruptcy 
The US bankruptcy code defines two main possibilities for personal bankruptcy. Under 
Chapter 13, which is not considered in this paper, the filer agrees to a payment plan with his 
creditors, typically over the course of three to five years, and keeps all of his assets in 
bankruptcy. Under Chapter 7, a debtor instead surrenders his non-exempt property to a 
bankruptcy trustee who then liquidates the property, and distributes the proceeds to the debtor's 
creditors. In exchange, the debtor is entitled to a discharge of debt.  
Bankruptcy exemptions define the assets that the debtor is permitted to retain in Chapter 
7 bankruptcy. Typically, every state has exemption laws that define the value of the property 
that can be protected from creditor collection actions within the state, while there also are 
federal exemptions applying in federal cases. Importantly, homestead exemptions define the 
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amount of housing wealth that debtors may protect from liquidation under Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.
5  
In the past thirty years, the United States has had two major reforms of its personal 
bankruptcy laws that have substantially affected the way in which exemptions may be used in 
personal bankruptcy.
6 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a comprehensive reform that 
established a uniform national set of exemptions while allowing states to opt out and set their 
own exemption levels if desired. Every state had set its own exemptions by 1983, although up 
to this day many states continue to allow debtors the option of using the federal exemptions.  
More recently, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) of 2005 placed three important limitations on the debtor's ability to engage in pre-
bankruptcy planning to enhance the use of bankruptcy exemptions.  
First, the act empowered judges to reverse any asset transfers between exemption and 
non-exemption categories made shortly before the bankruptcy filing. The objective was to 
prevent debtors from exchanging unprotected assets for assets protected under exemptions or 
transferring ownership of unprotected assets to friendly third parties at artificially low prices, 
only to reverse the transaction once the bankruptcy case was closed.  
5 There are also exemptions protecting other personal property from creditors. As we focus on home equity 
investment in this paper, we disregard these exemptions that tend to be small relative to the homestead exemption. 
 
6 There was one additional reform of bankruptcy legislation in the US in 1994 that did not concern bankruptcy 
exemptions.  
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Second, the reform of 2005 introduced a provision that aims to prevent households from 
“forum shopping”, i.e. moving to states with particularly generous exemptions shortly before 
declaring bankruptcy.
7  
Third, the reform placed a cap on the homestead exemption in situations where the 
debtor has added value to the homestead during the 1,215 days (about 3 years and 4 months) 
preceding the bankruptcy case. The pertinent provision provides that “any value in excess of 
$125,000” added to a homestead can not be exempted from bankruptcy. Exceptions apply if the 
additional value was transferred from another homestead within the same state, or if the 
homestead is the principal residence of a family farmer.
8  
The number of Chapter 7 filings peaked at about 1.4 million in 2005 before falling to 
about 400,000 in 2006, as households apparently tried to take advantage of the more favorable 
rules before BAPCPA was enacted. By 2009, the number of Chapter 7 filings had increased 
back to a level of about 1 million, which indicates that bankruptcy exemptions remain very 
relevant even after the reform of 2005. 
Table 1 presents data on homestead exemptions for the 50 US states and DC, with the 
federal homestead exemption at the bottom of the table. We present data for 1996, and for each 
of the years 2000-2006, corresponding to our sample period of 1996-2006 in the estimation 
below. We coded the state exemption level to the federal exemption, if the state permits the use 
7 Under BAPCPA if a debtor has moved to another state less than 730 days before a bankruptcy case, then the 
exemption of the debtor’s state of residence for the majority of the 180 day time period preceding the 730 days 
before the filing applies. If the new residency requirement renders the debtor ineligible for any state exemption, 
then the debtor can choose the federal exemption. See BAPCPA (2005), § 522(b)(3).  
 
8 Thus, the cap applies in situations where a debtor has purchased a new homestead in a different state, or where 
the debtor has increased the value to his homestead through a renovation or addition. See BAPCPA (2005), § 
522(p). 
  9 
                                                    
of the federal exemption and the state exemption is lower than the federal exemption.
9 The 
table shows considerable cross-sectional variation in homestead exemptions, with Maryland 
applying an exemption of zero, and 8 states, including Florida and Texas, applying an unlimited 
exemption in 2006.
10 If the exemption is unlimited, the household can retain its primary 
residence fully in bankruptcy regardless of its value. In the empirical work below, we code 
unlimited exemptions to a value of one million dollars in 2000, adjusting this amount for other 
years to reflect price level variation. 
Comparing homestead exemptions in 1996 and 2006, we see that most states increased 
exemption levels to some extent to offset inflation and maintain the real value of the 
exemptions. Several states, however, made more significant changes in their homestead 
exemptions. Rhode Island, for example, increased its exemption amount from $30,000 in 1996 
to $300,000 in 2006, DC moved from the federal homestead exemption to an unlimited 
exemption in 2006, and Delaware changed from a zero homestead exemption to an exemption 
of $50,000 in 2006 given that Delaware does not permit the use of the federal exemption. Thus, 
there is some time variation in homestead exemption levels, in addition to considerable cross-
state variation. 
 
3.  A model of home equity investment with bankruptcy exemption 
9 This applies to, for instance, Hawaii, Michigan, and New Jersey. 
10 Some states impose acreage limitations on homestead exemptions. For example, Texas's homestead 
exemption has no dollar value limit and has a 10 acres exemption limit for homesteads inside of a municipality 
(urban homestead) and 100 acres for those outside a municipality (rural homestead). The rural acre allotment is 
doubled for a family. Exemptions in Kansas and Oklahoma protect 160 acres of land of any value outside a 
municipality's corporate limits and 1 acre of land of any value within a municipality's corporate limits. The 
emphasis in our empirical work is on the dollar value limits of the homestead exemptions. 
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  To motivate subsequent empirical work, this section sets out a simple two-period model 
of wealth allocation in the presence of major expense risk. In the first period, the representative 
individual allocates his wealth W between two categories. First, the individual can invest in a 
wealth category H, that is covered by a bankruptcy exemption X > 0 in case of a second-period 
bankruptcy.  We will refer to H as housing, even though in practice other assets can be covered 
by an exemption as well, including clothing, furniture and pension rights. The bankruptcy 
exemption X includes any homestead exemption covering the home equity in a primary 
residence. The second wealth category, denoted B, represents all asset classes that are not 
potentially covered by an exemption. We will refer to B as bonds. 
The wealth categories, B and H, differ in two respects. First, we think of the protected 
wealth category, H, as owner occupied housing and, hence, H is taken to be a consumption 
good as well as an asset, while B is only an asset. Second, we assume that asset B dominates 
asset H in its investment return. Assets included in B, specifically, provide a return of r > 0, 
while the investment return on H is set to zero for simplicity.  
With probability π, the agent faces a major expense in the second period, denoted M, 
which can be thought of as an uninsurable medical expense.
11 We assume that M > W(1 + r) so 
that the medical expense will exhaust the individual’s second-period wealth and trigger a 
personal bankruptcy, even if he previously invested only in higher yielding bonds.
12 Second-
11 Jacoby et al. (2000) and Mathur (2006) find that illness or injury and resulting medical bills are implicated in 
more than half of personal bankruptcies. 
12 We can assume that a government program will cover the part of the medical bill that the individual cannot 
pay. Such a government program can be thought to be financed by a first-period tax τ on an endowment Y, with 
W = (1 – τ)Y being the after-tax endowment or wealth. The government budget is then given by  
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(continued)    
period wealth after any payment towards the medical bill is used for second-period, non-
housing consumption, C. With probability 1 – π, the agent does not face a medical bill and his 
consumption C equals B(1 + r) + H. With probability π, the individual, instead, consumes 
min[H, X], as X is the maximum wealth protection offered by the exemption. We will assume 
1 ) 1 )( 1 ( > + − r π to not exclude the possibility that the individual jointly holds bonds and housing 
less than the exemption. 
Utility derived from housing and non-housing consumption, U(H, C), is taken to be 
separable so that it can be written as V(H) + Z(C), with the Inada conditions applying.
13 In the 
first period, the agent chooses B and H so as to maximize expected utility, EU, written as
14
  )) , (min( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( X H Z H r B Z H V EU π π + + + − + =           (1) 
subject to the wealth constraint W = B + H, and to B ≥ 0 to prevent ‘strategic’ first-period 
borrowing to invest in the protected housing asset.
15   
))] 0 , max( ) 1 ( ( [ ) 1 ( X H r B M Y r − + + − = + π τ  
with r also representing the return on government surplus. The representative individual considers the tax rate τ 
as given. 
13 These are  , 0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' , 0 ) 0 ( < > = H V H V V , ) ( ' lim 0 ∞ = → H V H and  0 ) ( ' lim = ∞ → H V H , with 
analogous conditions applying to Z(C). 
14 In this specification, housing consumption can be taken to occur in either period or in both periods, with any 
discounting of utility from second-period consumption implicit in the subutility functions V and Z. 
15 The agent should not be able to obtain unsecured credit if H = W < X, as then there would never be any 
repayment if loan proceeds were invested in the home. With H = W > X, unsecured creditors can claim housing 
wealth in excess of the exemption (depending on their seniority relative to other claimants if the agent faces 
medical bills), which makes this kind or credit possible. Similarly, mortgage finance can be incorporated in the 
model. Extensions of this kind, however, do not change the incentive for the household to lower its marginal 
investment in housing out of wealth when housing investment reaches the exemption level.   
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  The marginal contributions of investments in bonds and housing to expected utility EU 
can be written as follows    
  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( H r B Z r
dB
dEU
+ + + − = π               (2) 
) ( ' ) , ( ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' H Z X H i H r B Z H V
dH
dEU
π π + + + − + =         (3) 
where i(H, X ) is an index function that equals 1 if H < X and 0 if H > X. A marginal 
investment in bonds is seen to add to second-period, non-housing consumption only in the 
absence of the medical expense. A marginal investment in housing also adds to second-period, 
non-housing consumption without the medical expense, and in addition if there is a medical 
expense and housing is fully covered by the exemption, i.e. H < X.  
  The first order conditions (2) and (3) imply two scenarios in which the agent is at the 
margin indifferent between allocating his wealth to bonds and to housing. First, the investment 
in housing may at the margin not be covered by the exemption so that we have 
dH
dEU
dB
dEU
=  
with H > X which implies 
) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( rH r W Z r − + + −π =  ) ( ' H V + ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( rH r W Z − + −π                  (4) 
where W – H has been substituted for B. 
  The relationship between W and H implicit in (4) is pictured as the ‘no protection’ line, 
labeled NP, in Figure 1. This schedule is upward sloping as (4) implies  
0
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 >
− + − +
− + + −
=
rH r W Z r H V
rH r W Z r r
dW
dH
π
π  
where H ≤ W as B ≥ 0.  We consider the case where along the NP schedule 
) ( '
) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( '
) ) 1 ( ( ' '
H V
H V
rH r W Z
rH r W Z
>
− +
− + , which means that the marginal utility of housing consumption 
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declines relatively fast. In this case, we have dH/dW < 1 so that the NP schedule has a slope of 
less than one in Figure 1, and it starts at the origin.
16  
  Second, the individual can be indifferent between investing in bonds and housing for the 
case where housing wealth is fully exempted from bankruptcy in the bad state. From (3) and 
(4), we see that 
dH
dEU
dB
dEU
=  with H < X implies 
  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( rH r W Z r − + + −π  =   ) ( ' H V +  ) ) 1 ( ( ' ) 1 ( rH r W Z − + −π + ) ( ' H Z π    (5) 
  The relationship between W and H implicit in (5) is now pictured as the ‘protection’ 
line, labeled P, in Figure 1. This schedule is upward sloping as (5) implies  
  0
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' ' ) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 >
− + − + +
− + + −
=
rH r W Z r H Z H V
rH r W Z r r
dW
dH
π π
π  
where H ≤ W as B ≥ 0.  We further assume that along the P schedule we have 
) ( ' ' ) ( '
) ( ' ' ) ( ' '
) ) 1 ( ( '
) ) 1 ( ( ' '
H Z H V
H Z H V
rH r W Z
rH r W Z
π
π
+
+
>
− +
− +  (a relatively fast decline of the marginal utility of housing 
consumption) to guarantee dH/dW < 1.
17 The P schedule thus has a slope of less than one, and 
it meets the 45
o line with wealth equal to Wp as implicit in  ) ( ' p W V = ) ( ' ] 1 ) 1 )( 1 [( p W Z r − + −π . 
Note that the P schedule is situated above the NP schedule, as for given values of wealth and 
housing, 
dH
dEU
dB
dEU
=  with H > X in (4) implies 
dH
dEU
dB
dEU
<  for same H and W and with H < 
X  in (5). This implies Wp  > 0. 
16 The provided condition and (4) imply dH/dW < 1. 
17 This condition and (5) imply dH/dW < 1. 
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  Next, we consider how the optimal investment in housing H varies with the individual’s 
wealth, W. With the Inada conditions applying, the agent allocates his entire wealth to 
‘housing’ to guarantee some second-period, non-housing consumption at very low levels of 
wealth.
18 At a certain higher level of wealth, the individual start to invest jointly in bonds and in 
housing.  
We can now distinguish two possible overall relationships between wealth and housing, 
depending on the size of the exemption, X, relative to the wealth levels at which the individual 
starts to invest in bonds with the housing investment protected, denoted Wp.  
 
Case A: X > Wp  (weak preference for housing consumption) 
  This is a case of a weak relative preference for housing consumption, as the individual 
starts to invest jointly in bonds and housing at a level of wealth Wp below the exemption X.  
The overall relationship between wealth and housing is now pictured in Figure 2, Panel 
A. For wealth levels up to Wp, the individual just holds housing. At that point, the investor 
starts to invest jointly in both bonds and housing, along the P schedule. Housing continues to 
rise with wealth until housing equals the exemption level, i.e. H = X. At that point, the marginal 
contribution of higher housing to expected utility (i.e., 
dH
dEU  for H rising) drops, as any further 
investment in housing no longer adds to second-period, non-housing consumption in the bad 
state. Therefore, the individual starts to invest at the margin only in bonds until the NP schedule 
18 Note that the wealth insurance offered by the exemption is valuable to the individual as without it he obtains 
a subutility Z of zero with probability π. However, this insurance comes at a cost of biasing consumption 
towards housing if a housing allocation is chosen above the NP schedule. The optimal level of the exemption X 
in this model is not considered. 
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is reached at a wealth levelW ˆ .
19 At that wealth level, the individual starts to invest jointly in 
bonds and housing again, along the NP schedule. For wealth levels below W ˆ in the figure, the 
individual is seen to hold additional wealth in the form of housing on account of a housing 
exemption that covers the marginal investment in housing.  
 
Case B:  X Wp ≥  (strong preference for housing consumption) 
  This is a case of a strong preference for housing consumption, as the individual starts to 
invest jointly in bonds and housing at a wealth level equal to the exemption. 
The relationship between wealth and housing is now presented in Figure 2, Panel B. For 
wealth levels up to X the investor just holds housing. At that point, any further investment in 
housing ceases to add to second-period, non-housing consumption in the bad state. Therefore, 
the investor only invests in bonds at the margin as wealth increases until the NP schedule is 
reached at a wealth level W ˆ . For higher wealth levels, the investor invests jointly in bonds and 
housing, along the NP schedule. For wealth below W ˆ , the individual is now seen to maintain a 
higher housing investment on account of the exemption. 
 
  In both panels of Figure 2, the marginal investment in housing, dH/dW, is higher at the 
lowest levels of wealth than it is at very high levels of wealth. Furthermore, the marginal 
investment in housing out of wealth drops in both panels when housing investment reaches the 
19 Using (4) we can find W ˆ  implicitly from  ) ( ' ) ) 1 ( ˆ ( ' ) 1 ( X V X r W rZ = − + −π . 
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exemption level. In the empirical work below, we test whether marginal investment in housing 
is relatively high if investment in housing is below the exemption level. 
 
4.   The data 
  We use household data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation of the US 
Census Bureau that at each moment tracks about 30,000 households. Our sample period is from 
1996 to 2006. During this period, information was collected from three consecutive groups of 
households or panels that were interviewed during the years 1996-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-
2006, respectively. During its active period, each panel is interviewed many times with 
intervals of several months, while panels of households do not overlap across periods. During a 
calendar year, the households in a panel are typically asked to answer different questions at 
different times, with for our purposes no repetition of the same relevant question within a 
calendar year. This enables us to organize the data by calendar year, yielding at least 2 usable 
years of data per panel and with some households moving between states and thus subject to 
different state homestead exemptions in our sample. 
  The SIPP collects information on home ownership, home value and mortgage debt, as 
well as on a wide range of other real and financial assets and liabilities. The SIPP thus is well 
suited to study household portfolio allocation, and in particular the share of a household’s net 
worth that is held in the form of home equity in the household’s primary residence. As we 
know whether a household owns its home, the underlying home ownership decision can be 
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examined as well. The SIPP, in addition, contains other information on household composition 
and characteristics that can be considered to affect the home equity investment decision.
20 
  A first variable used in this study is Own, which is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if the household owns its residence, and it is zero otherwise (see the Appendix for 
variable definitions and data sources). The mean ownership rate in our sample is 72% as seen in 
Table 2, which provides summary statistics on main variables. The mean Home equity, 
computed as house value minus mortgage debt, is seen to be $79,389. The average home value 
equals $119,036, the average household monthly income is $4,447, and total debt per 
household amounts to $56,233.  
  A key household characteristic is the variable Age, which is the age of the household 
head. A household’s home equity can be expected to increase with age, as mortgage debt tends 
to be paid down over time. In the regressions below we control for the lifecycle profile of 
investment in real estate by using an age spline. Health also potentially affects a household’s 
investment in exempted home equity. The Good health variable is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the health of the household head is reported to be good, very good or excellent, 
corresponding to a score of at least 3 on a scale from 1 to 5. By this measure, 55% of household 
heads have a good health. Members denotes the number of individual household members, with 
a mean value of 2.55. A larger family is expected to own a larger and more expensive 
residence. Married is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the household head is 
20 We cleaned the data based on a number of consistency checks. We dropped home-owing households with 
zero income or with large negative values of home equity (less than -$300,000), and we eliminated observations 
with very large positive or negative changes in wealth (in excess of 400%, corresponding to 1.5% of the 
sample). 
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married, and zero otherwise. Marriage may signal household stability promoting home 
ownership. The average homestead exemption, when finite, is seen to be $50,378, while 17% of 
the households in the sample reside in a state with unlimited homestead exemptions. Below is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the household’s home equity is less than the exemption level, 
which is the case for 54% of households. 
As documented by Goodman (1993), homestead exemptions were used to attract 
indebted settlers to mainly uninhabited areas, as these exemptions allowed people to acquire a 
new home out of reach of previous creditors. Those regions, where it was more difficult to 
settle, required higher homestead exemptions to be attractive to potential settlers. Hynes, 
Malani and Posner (2004) document that state-level exemption levels have been quite 
persistent, which suggests that current exemption levels still reflect the determinants of 
historical exemption levels. We take advantage of this by using the 1920 homestead exemption 
as an instrument for current exemptions levels below. Average 1920 homestead exemption 
levels were $1,699 in 1920 US dollars. Finally, the state-level rate of house price appreciation 
was 3.5% a year on average. 
 
5.  Empirical implementation   
  The main prediction of the model in section 3 is that marginal household investment in 
home equity is higher, if the household’s home equity is below the exemption level rather than 
above it. In regression 1 of Table 3, we start by simply relating changes in (the log of) home 
equity to changes in (the log of) wealth for all households. The estimated coefficient is 0.569, 
and it is significant at the 1% level. Only home owners can make marginal changes in home 
equity in response to marginal changes in wealth. Restricting the sample to home-owning 
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households in regression (2), we find that the estimated coefficient increases to 0.997, which 
suggests that such households invest almost all additional wealth in their home. In regression 3, 
we permit the coefficient on changes in log wealth to differ depending on whether the 
household’s home equity is above or below the homestead exemption in his state of residency. 
We find a steeper slope for households below the exemption, as indicated by an estimated 
coefficient of 0.102 for the Delta wealth*Below variable that is significant at the 1% level.  
An increase in house prices may affect both the change in home equity and the change 
in overall wealth. This could result in spurious correlation between these two variables. Hence, 
it is important to emphasize that we identify the effect of exemptions on home equity by 
focusing on the difference between the coefficients on the change in wealth above and below 
the exemption. As long as the effects of house prices on both home equity and total wealth do 
not differ systematically for levels of home equity below and above the exemption, this 
identification strategy should be valid. This is quite likely, given that exemption levels differ 
widely across states. In addition, in order to further alleviate concerns about endogeneity, we 
instrument for the change in wealth below, and obtain consistent results.  
In regression 4, we add squared and cubed terms of changes in wealth yielding a 
somewhat larger coefficient of 0.255 for Delta wealth*Below that is significant at 1%. In 
regression 5, we add further controls related to a household’s home value, financial situation, 
health and age, and the state’s house price appreciation. The Delta wealth*Below term obtains a 
coefficient of 0.247 that is significant at 1%. For regression 5 we cannot reject that the sum of 
the estimated coefficients on the two Delta wealth terms for households with home equity 
below the exemption are equal to one, consistent with the theoretical model. Households thus 
invest a share of marginal wealth close to unity in their homes if their home equity is below the 
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exemption, and marginal investment in home equity jumps down significantly around the 
exemption level. 
We further find that a smaller share of marginal wealth is invested in the homestead, if 
the household head classifies himself as in good health. The estimated coefficient for the Good 
health variable is significant at the 1% level. Households with healthier household heads could 
invest less in home equity partly because they are less in need of any exemption from 
bankruptcy, consistent with our theoretical model. Household investment in real estate 
potentially depends on the level of prior investment in real estate. We find that marginal 
investment in housing is positively related to household’s home value. Changes in home equity 
are further seen to be negatively related to household income and total household debt. We also 
find that marginal investment in home equity varies with age. As household heads age, they 
tend to invest less in home equity. Finally, note that the house price appreciation is only weakly 
associated with changes in home equity after we control for overall changes in wealth and use 
state fixed effects. 
In Table 4 we perform a simple illustrative simulation using the coefficients from 
regression 5 of Table 3 to ascertain the economic magnitude of the effect of exemptions on the 
allocation of wealth by a typical household. The economic effect is driven by the differences in 
coefficients that relate changes in log home equity to changes in log wealth for households with 
housing investment below and above the exemption. Approximately, the coefficients can be 
interpreted as relating percentage changes in home equity to percentage changes in wealth.  In 
the simulation, we start out with the sample median wealth level of homeowners (net of total 
debt) at age 25 of $30,000 (of which $22,000 is invested in home equity and $8,000 in other 
instruments), and use the sample average growth rate of wealth net of debt of 5.1% per year. 
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We compare a household that resides in a state with an exemption level equal to or below 
$20,000 (including Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, Tennessee 
and Virginia) to a household that resides in a state with an exemption level equal to or above 
$200,000 (including Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Vermont).  
As indicated in the table, our estimation implies that the percentage change in home 
equity equals 70.6% of the percentage change in wealth for a household with home equity 
exceeding the exemption, while it is 94.9% for a household with home equity less than the 
exemption.
 21 Thus, the percentage change in home equity is 24.3% lower as a share of the 
percentage change in real wealth if marginal investments in home equity are not covered by the 
exemption.  
The table provides summary information on the allocation of wealth over the life time 
of the household. Specifically, at age 60, a household in a low exemption state would have 
$75,095 invested in real estate and $93,727 in non-real estate. In contrast, for a household in a 
high exemption state the amounts would be $113,519 in real estate and $55,303 in non-real 
estate, i.e. a difference in the amount invested in real estate of about $38,000. Households in 
high exemption states thus are simulated to allocate a significantly large sharer of their wealth 
towards housing than households in low exemption states. 
22 
21 See also Note 3 at the bottom of Table 4 for further details on the calculations. 
22 In the data set, the median home equity of households at age 60 is $88,389. This is in between the amounts of 
$75,095 and $113,519 simulated for households that have always lived in very low and very high exemption 
states between ages 25 and 60, respectively. A comparable household with home equity that passes the 
exemption threshold between ages 25 and 60 would be simulated to have home equity at age 60 between these 
two simulated values potentially in the vicinity of $88,389. Hence, our simulation model, which assumes a 
constant relationship over the life cycle between the percentage change in home equity and the percentage 
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(continued)    
  Next, we consider the effect of including a polynomial of order ten for changes in 
wealth on our estimation of the role of the Delta wealth*Below variable. While we feel that a 
10
th order polynomial represents an over-parameterization of the relationship between marginal 
changes in wealth and marginal changes in home equity, we want to check whether with very 
high order polynomials, i.e. allowing for a highly nonlinear relationship between changes in 
wealth and changes in investment in real estate, we continue to find an impact of housing 
wealth relative to the exemption on the marginal investment in housing. All control variables 
are as before. The results are reported as regression 1 in Table 5. We obtain an estimate of 
0.337 for Delta wealth*Below that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Most higher order 
terms are insignificant (unreported). Hence, we can be confident that our estimation of the role 
of the Delta wealth*Below variable is not a reflection of some unaccounted for nonlinearity in 
the relationship between the change in wealth and the change in home equity.
23  
The homestead exemption potentially affects the home equity investment of home 
owners as well as the earlier home ownership decision. To control for the potential impact of 
the homestead exemption on the selection of home owners, we estimate a Heckman two-stage 
selection model where the first stage concerns the selection of home owners, and the second 
stage the home equity investment of home owners. The selection variable is the household 
head’s marital status, reflected in the Married variable, as marriage can imply household 
stability and promote home ownership, even if married couples may not purchase different 
change in overall wealth depending on the value of home equity relative to the exemption, does very well in 
predicting the absolute level of investment in home equity at age 60. Note that at age 60.69% of households in 
the sample have home equity above the exemption threshold. 
23 In unreported regressions we also checked whether the results change if we drop the post bankruptcy reform 
(BAPCPA) years 2005 and 2006, and found essentially unchanged coefficients. 
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homes or finance them differently. The results of the second stage regression are reported as 
regression 2 of Table 5. The Delta wealth*Below variable obtains a coefficient of 0.247 that is 
significant at the 1% level and identical to the corresponding coefficient in regression 5 of 
Table 3. This suggests that the selection issue does not bias the estimate of the coefficient for 
the Delta wealth*Below variable in the benchmark regression. 
The state-level exemption level is possibly endogenous to home equity investment, say 
on account of political pressures from home owners. Rising home equity investment could 
possibly lead to additional political demands from home owners for bankruptcy protection, 
giving rise to higher homestead exemptions. Hynes, Malani and Posner (2004) have considered 
several explanatory variables for the state-level homestead exemption on political grounds 
(including the individual bankruptcy rate, the number of banks per 100,000 population, and 
government transfers per capita), failing to find any statistically significant relation. These 
authors conclude that the best explanation for the current homestead exemption is the past 
exemption level, which is testimony to a high persistence of state-level homestead exemption 
policies. 
This also suggests that to understand current state-level variation in homestead 
exemptions we have to go back to the historical reasons for their introduction. As documented 
by Goodman (1993), a main reason for the introduction of homestead exemptions in 19
th 
century America was to enable a state (or territory) to attract indebted settlers from other 
regions with the prospect of being able to establish a homestead out of reach of creditors. Texas 
introduced the first homestead law in 1839 to attract southern agriculturalists heavily burdened 
by debts following the depression of the late 1830s. Other Southern states soon retaliated with 
their own homestead exemption laws, starting with Georgia and Mississippi in 1841 (see 
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Goodman (1993), Table 1). Historical homestead exemption levels thus can be seen as an 
equilibrium outcome of a game where states use exemption policies to attract additional 
settlers. In this equilibrium, relatively unattractive states need to institute relatively high 
homestead exemptions to be competitive to potential settlers.
24  
In an instrumental variable regression, we use the 1920 exemption as an instrument for 
the homestead exemption level. We exclude all households in states with unlimited exemptions. 
We then use the predicted values of the instrumental variable regression to calculate Below and 
rerun the baseline model.
25 The results are reported as regression 3 of Table 5. The Delta 
wealth*Below variable obtains a coefficient of 0.345, significant at the 1% level. The F-test of 
excluded instruments is rejected at the 1% level, which suggests that the 1920 exemption level 
is an appropriate instrument for today’s exemption. 
An increase in house prices may affect both the change in home equity and the change 
in overall wealth. This could result in spurious correlation between these two variables, as long 
as the change in local real estate values, included as a control, is not sufficient to measure this 
effect. In order to alleviate this concern, regression 4 in Table 5 shows results of instrumental 
variable regressions, in which we use the annual change in the S&P 500 index as an instrument 
for Delta wealth. This is akin to the identification strategy employed in Chetty and Szeidl 
24 Regions that were relatively unattractive to settlers required more time to acquire sufficient populations to 
officially become a US state. Thus, a state’s year of statehood is a useful index of a state’s attractiveness, and it 
should be positively correlated with the state exemption level. The correlation between Log statehood and Log 
exemption with data for 2000 is calculated to be 0.36. In this calculation, we exclude DC, as according to the 
US constitution this is not a US state. 
25 This amounts to estimating what Angrist and Pischke (2009) refer to as a “fuzzy regression discontinuity 
model”, as instead of estimating the discontinuity off a known threshold (the actual exemption level), we 
estimate it using an estimated threshold. 
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(2010) and amounts to focusing on changes in wealth due to changes in the value of financial 
assets. The instrument is significant at the 1% level at the first stage, and the second stage 
results confirm the earlier findings: the coefficient for the instrumented change in wealth below 
the exemption is positive and significant at the 1% level.
26 
Next, we consider whether the sensitivity of a household’s home equity share to the 
exemption level depends on the household head’s age and health. First, in regression 1 of Table 
6 we include an interaction variable of Delta wealth*Below with a dummy variable set to one if 
the household head is younger than 40 years. Now the Delta wealth*Below variable itself 
obtains a coefficient of 0.010 that remains significant at 5%, while the triple interaction variable 
receives a coefficient of 0.468 that significant at 1%. This suggests that the jump down in the 
the marginal investment in home equity at the exemption level is much larger for young 
households. Potential reasons are that younger households face more economic uncertainty that 
could result in bankruptcy, that older households move less frequently and thus have fewer 
opportunities to adjust the value of their home to their optimal home equity investment, and that 
older households are more likely to have paid down their initial mortgage.
27 
  In regression 2 we include an interaction variable of the Delta wealth*Below variable 
and an indicator variable for poor health. Poor health is expected to increase the demand for 
home equity in household portfolios to the extent that less healthy households are more likely 
to be hit by catastrophic health care bills that can trigger personal bankruptcy. The triple 
26 We interacted the instrumented Delta wealth with the Below dummy one period lagged.  
27 It may also be the case that older households have more difficulty in obtaining home equity loans as a means 
to fine tune their home equity investment. 
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interaction term, however, obtains a negative coefficient of -0.171 that is significant at 1%, 
suggesting that households experiencing poor health invest more in home equity at the margin 
when the exemption in not binding.  
Next, we recognize that age and health are strongly negatively correlated, which 
suggests that the estimation of the triple interaction terms in both regressions 1 and 2 are 
subject to left-out-variable bias. To correct this, regression 3 includes the two previous triple 
interaction variables as well as an additional quadruple variable of Delta wealth*Below with 
the household age and health indicator variables. In regression 3, the Delta 
wealth*Below*(Age<40) variable is estimated with a coefficient of 0.473 that is significant at 
1%, while the other three multiple interaction variables are estimated to be insignificant. This is 
evidence that younger households, regardless of their health status, bias their investment 
portfolios towards home equity with a view to obtain wealth insurance against bankruptcy 
through the homestead exemption. 
Finally, we check whether households not only adjust the intensive margin of investing 
in their home given that they own a home, but also the extensive margin of owning a home. In 
particular, we estimate a set of probit regressions of home ownership that use the state level 
homestead exemption directly as an explanatory variable. For this purpose, we define the 
Exemption variable as the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars divided by 1,000,000, 
while it is set to zero in case the exemption is unlimited. The results are reported in Table 7. To 
start, regression 1 excludes observations of unlimited homestead exemptions. In this regression, 
the Married variable (our instrument in the Heckman sample selection specification in Table 5) 
obtains a coefficient of 0.684 that is significant at the 1% level, suggesting a strong positive 
relationship between marriage and home ownership. The exemption variable obtains a 
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coefficient of 0.175 that is statistically insignificant. In regression 2, we include households that 
face an unlimited exemption, and add a dummy variable that is equal to one if in fact the 
exemption is unlimited. The coefficient on the exemption level is insignificant, but we obtain a 
positive coefficient on the unlimited dummy that is significant at the 1% level.  
To explore whether this effect is indeed due to the unlimited nature of the exemption, 
we construct the Exemption II variable where we code the exemption to be $1,000,000 if it is 
unlimited (before dividing by 1,000,000). We then re-estimate regressions 1 and 2 after 
replacing the Exemption variable by the Exemption II variable. In regression 3, we obtain a 
positive and significant coefficient on the modified exemption variable. With the unlimited 
dummy included in regression 4, however, the modified exemption variable is insignificant and 
only the unlimited variable obtains a positive and significant coefficient (at the 10% level).  
While we cannot fully exclude that the homestead exemption has a material impact on home 
ownership, this effect seems to be confined to cases in which the exemption is unlimited. 
At first glance, it is somewhat surprising that there is only limited evidence that the 
homestead exemption affects the home ownership decision. After all, one expects the demand 
for wealth insurance against personal bankruptcy that is found to be a significant determinant of 
the marginal investment in home equity to also affect the demand for owning a home, as home 
ownership is a prerequisite for benefiting from the homestead bankruptcy exemption.
28  
A household, however, can unilaterally decide to alter its home equity share by repaying 
part or its entire mortgage (which is to say that the supply of mortgage credit to households is 
28 In the model of section 3, households always invest a positive share of their wealth in asset H, which can be 
taken to mean that they always purchase a home. While this clearly is a simplification, it implies that the level 
of the exemption, if positive, does not affect the home ownership decision.  
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fully elastic in a downward way once a mortgage has been provided). Home ownership, 
instead, reflects the demand for generally mortgage-financed homes by households as well as 
the supply of mortgage finance. The exemption may have little impact on home ownership, 
because households that wish to purchase a home to protect against personal bankruptcy are the 
same households that face difficulty in financing a home purchase.
29  
 
6.  Conclusions 
  For many households, their home is their single most important asset. Thus, investment 
in home equity is a key aspect of household portfolio choice.  Recent contributions on the 
determination of housing in household portfolios have focused on the joint home ownership 
and housing consumption decision, and on high transaction costs that make the home 
investment decision special. Home equity investment is also special in that home equity tends 
to benefit from a favorable treatment in US personal bankruptcy law in the form of homestead 
exemptions. This paper is the first to examine how homestead exemptions affect the share of 
housing in household portfolios using detailed US household data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation over the 1996-2006 period. 
  We estimate that the percentage change in home equity as a share of the percentage 
change in overall wealth is 24.3% lower if the marginal investment in home equity is not 
covered by the exemption. Our baseline coefficients suggest that at age 60 households in high 
29 The homestead exemption could affect home ownership through its impact on home purchases as well as 
through its impact on home retention for households that experience financial distress. Li and White (2009) and 
Li, White and Zhu (2009) argue that bankruptcy reform introduced in 2005 that limited the bankruptcy shield 
offered by homestead exemptions increased foreclosure rates.  
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exemption states allocate about $38,000 more towards real estate compared to households in 
low exemptions states. This amounts to more than 20% of their total average wealth. The jump 
down in marginal investment in housing is more pronounced for younger households that may 
face a higher probability of personal bankruptcy. We find no evidence that our results suffer 
from selection bias due to limiting ourselves to homeowners, while there is only a weak 
relationship between home ownership and the homestead exemption. In some specifications, 
home ownership is estimated to be more likely in states with unlimited exemptions.   
The bias in household portfolios towards home equity induced by its special bankruptcy 
protection suggests that these portfolios are not efficient as they expose the household to too 
much real estate risk in no-bankruptcy states of the world. Wealth protection against personal 
bankruptcy may be desirable (as suggested, for instance, by Li and Sarte (2006) on the basis of 
a simulation model), but its provision through an exemption for home equity appears to be 
unnecessarily distorting household portfolio choice.  
An exemption for home equity could be rationalized if it were to influence home 
ownership, and if in addition home ownership produced positive externalities on neighborhood 
stability, as claimed by a substantial literature.
30 However, we do not find robust evidence that 
homestead exemptions affect home ownership. Thus, the costs of homestead exemptions in 
biasing household portfolios towards home equity are clear, while there are no obvious 
counterbalancing benefits of singling out home equity for special bankruptcy protection. 
This paper documents the microeconomic cost of homestead exemptions by showing 
that household portfolios tend to be biased towards home equity. At the macroeconomic level, 
30 Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), for instance, find a negative relation between home ownership and crime. 
  30 
                                                    
homestead exemptions potentially lead to biases as well. Any macroeconomic distortion 
depends on how increased demand for home equity at the micro level is accommodated at the 
macro level. Potential macroeconomic responses to higher homestead exemptions are higher 
average house prices and reduced aggregate mortgage financing demand in the short run, and 
increased housing construction in the long run. The macroeconomic implications of homestead 
exemption, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. Our results imply that homestead 
exemptions distort household asset portfolio without bringing about clear benefits in terms of 
increased home ownership. The paper therefore contributes to the policy debate about the 
desirability of homestead exemptions.
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Table 1. Homestead exemptions by state in 1996 and 2000-2006 
 
  1996  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
State                 
                 
Alabama  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Alaska  54,000  62,000  64,800  64,800  64,800  67,500  67,500  67,500 
Arizona  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  150,000  150,000 
Arkansas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
California  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000  75,000 
Colorado  60,000  60,000  60,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000 
Connecticut  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
DC  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  Unlimited 
Delaware  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  50,000 
Florida  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Georgia  10,000  10,000  10,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000 
Hawaii  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Idaho  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000 
Illinois  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Indiana  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Iowa  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Kansas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Kentucky  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Louisiana  15,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000  25,000 
Maine  25,000  25,000  25,000  50,000  12,300  70,000  70,000  70,000 
Maryland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Massachusetts  100,000  100,000  100,000  300,000  300,000  500,000  500,000  500,000 
Michigan  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Minnesota  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
Mississippi  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
Missouri  8,000  8,000  8,000  8,000  8,000  15,000  15,000  15,000 
Montana  80,000  120,000  120,000  120,000  120,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
Nebraska  10,000  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500  12,500 
Nevada  125,000  125,000  125,000  125,000  125,000  200,000  200,000  350,000 
New Hampshire  60,000  60,000  60,000  100,000  100,000  200,000  200,000  200,000 
New Jersey  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
New Mexico  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000  60,000 
New York  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  100,000 
North Carolina  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  37,000 
North Dakota  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000 
Ohio  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Oklahoma  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Oregon  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  33,000  30,000 
Pennsylvania  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
Rhode Island  30,000  32,300  34,850  150,000  150,000  150,000  200,000  300,000 
South Carolina  30,000  32300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
South Dakota  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Tennessee  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500  7,500 
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Texas  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited  Unlimited 
Utah  10,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
Vermont  60,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000  150,000 
Virginia  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000 
Washington  30,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
West Virginia  30,000  30,000  30,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000  50,000 
Wisconsin  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
Wyoming  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000  20,000 
                 
Federal exemption  30,000  32,300  34,850  34,850  34,850  36,900  36,900  40,400 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of main variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the main regression variables. Own is a dummy variable that equals  
one if the household owns a home, and zero otherwise. Home equity is household home equity. Home value is 
the value of the residence if owned, and zero otherwise. Income is total household income. Total debt is total 
household debt. Wealth is total household net worth. Good health is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
household head reports health that is good, very good, or excellent, and zero otherwise. Age is the age of the 
household head. Married is a dummy variable that equals one if the household head is married, and zero 
otherwise. Members is the number of individuals in the household. Exemption is the state-level homestead 
exemption. Unlimited is a dummy variable that equals one if the exemption is unlimited, and zero otherwise. 
Below is a dummy variable that equals one if household home equity is less than the exemption level, and zero 
otherwise. House price appreciation is the annual percentage change in the deflated state-level OFHEO house 
price index.  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
Own  138,848  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Home equity  138,848  79,389  110,174  -95,000  850,000 
Home value  138,848  119,036  139,710  0  850,000 
Income  138,848  4,447  4,738  -3,611  342,957 
Total debt  138,848  56,233  109,919  -409,000  11,500,000 
Δln(wealth)  138,848  0.090  0.979  -3.99  3.99 
Δln(home equity)  138,848  0.246  1.540  -12.07  13.65 
Good health  138,848  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Age  138,848  52.19  16.75  16  88 
Members  138,848  2.55  1.46  1  16 
Married  138,848  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Exemption  115,121  50,378  63,450  0  500,000 
Unlimited  138,848  0.17  0.38  0  1 
Below  138,848  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Exemption (1920)  75,298  1,699  1,443  0  5,000 
House price appreciation  138,848  0.035  0.031  -0.04  0.22 
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Table 3. Homestead exemptions and investments in home equity 
 
The dependent variable is the first difference in log home equity. Delta wealth is the difference in log wealth. 
Delta wealth*Below represents an indicator whether the household is below the homestead exemption times the 
first difference in log wealth. Log home equity represents the log of household home equity. Log income is the 
log of total household income. Log total debt is the log of total household debt. Delta income and Delta total 
debt represent the first difference in log income and log total debt, respectively. Good health is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the household head reports health that is good, very good, or excellent, and zero 
otherwise. Age is the age of the household head. House price appreciation is the annual percentage change in 
the deflated state-level OFHEO house price index. The sample is limited to households that own a house. 
Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering 
at the household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Delta wealth  0.569*** 
(0.012) 
0.997*** 
(0.021) 
0.951*** 
(0.018) 
0.758*** 
(0.025) 
0.697*** 
(0.025) 
Delta wealth squared        0.193*** 
(0.012) 
0.179*** 
(0.012) 
Delta wealth cube        0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
Delta wealth*Below      0.102*** 
(0.033) 
0.255*** 
(0.064) 
0.247*** 
(0.063) 
Delta wealth 
squared*Below 
      -0.094*** 
(0.013) 
-0.070*** 
(0.012) 
Delta wealth 
cube*Below 
      -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
Log home value          0.241*** 
(0.013) 
Log income            -0.087*** 
(0.009) 
Log total debt          -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Good health          -0.045*** 
(0.010) 
Age ≤  24          1.423*** 
(0.115) 
Age >24 & ≤34          0.801*** 
(0.032) 
Age>34  & ≤44          0.281*** 
(0.015) 
Age >44 & ≤54          0.155*** 
(0.014) 
Age>54 & ≤64          0.063*** 
(0.015) 
House price 
appreciation 
        0.294 
(0.216) 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.13  0.23  0.23  0.25  0.28 
N  138,848  100,558  100,558  100,558  100,558 
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Table 4. Economic effects of exemptions  
 
We start out with the median wealth net of debt of a household at age 25 of a homeowner in the sample, which 
is $30,000. We use the fact that in the sample $22,000 of this total is home equity and the remainder other 
investments. We use the average annual growth rate of net worth in the sample of 5.06%, ignoring cohort 
effects. For all controls we assume that households in low and high exemptions states are identical, i.e. have the 
same levels of all control variables. We then obtain the following outcomes for the case where the exemption is 
equal to or below $20,000 vs. the exemption is equal to or above $200,000, i.e. households in low exemptions 
states are always above the exemption and households in high exemption states are always below. For 
simplicity, we are assuming equal returns on investment in home equity as in other investments. Pension wealth 
is not considered. 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  Exemption ≤ 20,000
1/  Exemption ≥ 200,000
2/ 
Initial total wealth at age 25  30,000  30,000 
of which in HE  22,000  22,000 
of which in non-HE  8,000  8,000 
Growth rate of wealth per year  5.06%  5.06% 
Percentage change in HE as a share of 
percentage change in wealth  70.6%
3/  94.9%
3/ 
Implied growth rate of home equity  3.57%  4.80% 
Total wealth at age 60  168,822  168,822 
of which in HE  75,095  113,519 
of which in non-HE  93,727  55,303 
1/ e.g., Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia. 
2/ e.g., Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, DC (after 2005), 
Massachusetts (after 2002), Montana (after 2004), New Hampshire (after 2004), and Rhode Island (after 2005). 
3/ Calculation: Without exemption: [ ] W W W W ∆ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ / ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ 3
3
2
2 1 β β β = [0.697*0.0506 + 0.179*(0.0506)
2 - 
0.014*(0.0506)
3]/0.0506.
 With exemption: [
3
3
2
2 1 ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ W W W ∆ + ∆ + ∆ β β β + 
] W W W W ∆ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ / ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ
3
3
2
2 1 γ γ γ = [0.697*0.0506 + 0.179*(0.0506)
2 - 0.014*(0.0506)
3+0.247*0.0506-
0.070*(0.0506)
2-0.005(0.0506)
3]/0.0506. β ˆ and γˆ are the estimated coefficients from regression 5 in Table 3 and ∆𝑊 � is 
equal to the average annual growth rate of median wealth in the sample. 
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Table 5. Higher order polynomials, sample selection, endogeneity and slope effects 
 
The dependent variable is the difference in log home equity. Delta wealth is the difference in log wealth. Delta 
wealth*Below represents an indicator whether the household is below the homestead exemption times the first 
difference in log wealth. Control variables are as in Table 3 and unreported. In all regressions the sample is 
limited to households that own a house. Regression 1 includes a 10
th order polynomial in Delta wealth by itself 
and interacted with the discontinuity variable. The regression model in column 2 is a Heckman sample selection 
model. The instrument in the sample selection model is Married. This is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
household head is married, and zero otherwise. Lambda is Heckman’s lambda. Regression 3 is an IV regression 
with the level of the homestead exemption in 1920 as instrument for the contemporaneous exemption level.  
Regression 4 is an IV regression with the annual change in the S&P 500 index as an instrument for Delta 
wealth. Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, corrected for 
clustering at the household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables 
Higher order 
polynomials 
Sample 
selection 
Instrument for 
exemption 
Instrument for 
Delta wealth 
Delta wealth  0.557*** 
(0.020) 
0.699*** 
(0.011) 
0.712*** 
(0.025) 
0.568 
(0.556) 
Delta wealth squared  0.181*** 
(0.054) 
0.180*** 
(0.005) 
0.160*** 
(0.015) 
 
Delta wealth cube  0.193*** 
(0.029) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
 
Delta wealth*Below  0.337*** 
(0.088) 
0.247*** 
(0.017) 
0.345*** 
(0.067) 
2.979*** 
(0.433) 
Delta wealth 
squared*Below 
-0.014 
(0.116) 
-0.071*** 
(0.007) 
-0.057*** 
(0.019) 
 
Delta wealth cube*Below  -0.160** 
(0.067) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
 
Lambda    -0.185*** 
(0.018) 
   
Instrument (first stage)    0.229*** 
(0.033) 
30.47*** 
(9.72) 
1.057*** 
(0.40) 
Higher order polynomials  Yes  No  No  No 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.28    0.28  0.09 
N  100,558  138,848  75,298  100,558 
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Table 6. Vulnerable households 
 
The dependent variable is first difference in log home equity. Delta wealth is the difference in log wealth. Delta 
wealth*D represents an indicator whether the household is below the homestead exemption times the first 
difference in log wealth. Poor health is a dummy variable that equals one if the household head reports health 
that is not good, very good, or excellent, and zero otherwise. Age is the age of the household head. Control 
variables are as in Table 3 and unreported. In all regressions the sample is limited to households that own a 
house Regressions 2, 4, and (6) also include squared and cubed terms of the two and three way slope 
interactions, respectively. Regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, corrected for clustering at the household level. Coefficients not reported for brevity. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
   
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Variables 
     
Delta wealth  0.698*** 
(0.025) 
0.697*** 
(0.025) 
0.698*** 
(0.025) 
Delta wealth squared  0.180*** 
(0.012) 
0.180*** 
(0.012) 
0.180*** 
(0.012) 
Delta wealth cube  0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Delta wealth*Below  0.110** 
(0.053) 
0.275*** 
(0.065) 
0.120** 
(0.055) 
Delta wealth squared*Below  -0.102*** 
(0.014) 
-0.069*** 
(0.014) 
-0.107*** 
(0.016) 
Delta wealth cube*Below  0.001 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
Delta wealth*Below*(Age<40) 
 
0.468*** 
(0.058) 
  0.473*** 
(0.062) 
Delta wealth*Below*(Poor health)    -0.171*** 
(0.044) 
-0.034 
(0.050) 
Delta wealth*Below*(Age<40)*(Poor 
health) 
    -0.277 
(0.176) 
Higher order polynomials  No  No  No 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.28  0.28  0.28 
N  100,558  100,558  100,558 
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Table 7. Homestead exemptions and home ownership 
 
The dependent variable is a home ownership dummy variable that equals 1 if the household owns a home, and 
zero otherwise. Exemption is the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars divided by 1000000 and equal 
to zero if the exemption is unlimited. Exemption II is the state-level homestead exemption in US dollars with 
unlimited exemption levels set to 1 million US dollars divided by 1,000,000. Unlimited is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the homestead exemption is unlimited, and zero otherwise.  Log income is the log of total 
household income. Good health is a dummy variable that equals one if the household head reports health that is 
good, very good, or excellent, and zero otherwise. Age is the age of the household head. Married is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the household head is married, and zero otherwise. Members is the number of number 
of individuals in the household. House price appreciation is the annual percentage change in the deflated state-
level OFHEO house price index. All regressions include state fixed effects and year effects. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, corrected for clustering at the household level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables         
         
Exemption   0.175 
(0.151) 
0.158 
(0.148) 
   
Exemption II      0.310** 
(0.125) 
0.158 
(0.148) 
Unlimited    0.655*** 
(0.233) 
  0.497* 
(0.272) 
Log  income  0.345*** 
(0.006) 
0.335*** 
(0.006) 
0.335*** 
(0.006) 
0.335*** 
(0.006) 
Good health  0.252*** 
(0.010) 
0.246*** 
(0.009) 
0.246*** 
(0.009) 
0.246*** 
(0.009) 
Age ≤24  -1.920*** 
(0.034) 
-1.941*** 
(0.030) 
-1.941*** 
(0.030) 
-1.941*** 
(0.030) 
Age >24 & ≤34  -1.293*** 
(0.016) 
-1.325*** 
(0.015) 
-1.325*** 
(0.015) 
-1.325*** 
(0.015) 
Age>34  & ≤44  -0.789*** 
(0.015) 
-0.813*** 
(0.014) 
-0.813*** 
(0.014) 
-0.813*** 
(0.014) 
Age >44 & ≤54  -0.485*** 
(0.015) 
-0.491*** 
(0.013) 
-0.491*** 
(0.013) 
-0.491*** 
(0.013) 
Age>54 & ≤64  -0.238*** 
(0.015) 
-0.243*** 
(0.014) 
-0.243*** 
(0.014) 
-0.243*** 
(0.014) 
Married    0.684*** 
(0.011) 
0.674*** 
(0.010) 
0.674*** 
(0.010) 
0.674*** 
(0.010) 
Members  0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
House price 
appreciation 
0.177 
(0.197) 
0.132 
(0.181) 
0.180 
(0.179) 
0.132 
(0.181) 
State fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Pseudo R
2  0.22  0.21  0.21  0.21 
Observations  115,121  138,848  138,848  138,848 
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Figure 1. Housing with and without bankruptcy protection 
 
This figure plots housing investment, H, against wealth, W. The P and NP schedules represent points where 
marginal investment in housing is protected and not protected by the homestead exemption in case of a medical 
expense, respectively. 
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Figure 2. The relation between housing and wealth 
 
Panel A. Weak preferences for housing consumption 
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Panel B. Strong preferences for housing consumption 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable  Description  Sources 
Own  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household owns a home, 
and zero otherwise. 
SIPP 
Home equity  Household  home equity in US dollars  SIPP 
Home value  Value of the residence if owned, and zero otherwise  SIPP 
Income  Total household income.  SIPP 
Total debt  Ttotal household debt  SIPP 
Wealth  Total household net worth in US dollars  SIPP 
Good health  Dummy variable that equals one if the household head reports health 
that is good, very good, or excellent, and zero otherwise. 
SIPP 
Age  Age of household head  SIPP 
Members  Number of individuals in the household  SIPP 
Married  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the individual is married, 
and zero otherwise. 
SIPP 
House price appreciation  Annual percentage change in the deflated state-level house price index.  Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight 
Exemption  State-level homestead exemption in US dollars divided by 1,000,000 and 
equal to zero if the exemption is unlimited.  
Elias, Renauer, and Leonard, 
various years 
Exemption II  State-level homestead exemption in US dollars with unlimited 
exemption levels set to 1 million US dollars divided by 1,000,000. 
Elias, Renauer, and Leonard, 
various years 
Unlimited  Dummy variable that equals one if the homestead exemption is 
unlimited, and zero otherwise.   
Elias, Renauer, and Leonard, 
various years 
Below  Dummy variable that equals one if household home equity is less than 
the exemption level, and zero otherwise. 
Elias, Renauer, and Leonard, 
various years and SIPP 
Exemption 1920  State-level homestead exemption in US dollars in 1920 divided by 
1,000,000. Missing if the exemption is unlimited or for territories that 
attained statehood after 1920. 
 where doe s this come from? 
 
  
No. 20  Zeno Adams, Roland Füss, Reint 
Gropp 
Spillover Effects among Financial 
Institutions: A State-Dependent 
Sensitivity Value-at-Risk Approach 
     
No. 19  Reint Gropp, Christian Gruendl, 
Andre Guettler 
Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty 
Little Secrets: Investment in Soft 
Information, Borrower Self-selection 
and Competition 
     
No. 18  Alfons J. Weichenrieder, 
Jochen Zimmer 
Euro Membership and Fiscal Reaction 
Functions 
     
No. 17  Holger Kraft, Frank Thomas 
Seifried 
Stochastic Differential Utility as the 
Continuous-Time Limit of Recursive 
Utility 
     
No. 16  Marius Ascheberg, Nicole 
Branger, Holger Kraft 
When do Jumps Matter for Portfolio 
Optimization? 
     
No. 15  Holger Kraft, Claus Munk, Frank 
Thomas Seifried, Sebastian 
Wagner 
Habits and Humps 
     
No. 14  Dirk Bursian, Ester Faia  Trust in the Monetary Authority 
     
No. 13  Laurent E. Calvet, Paolo Sodini  Twin Picks: Disentangling the 
Determinants of Risk-Taking in 
Household Portfolios 
     
No. 12  Marcel Bluhm, Ester Faia, Jan 
Pieter Krahnen 
Endogenous Banks’ Networks, Cascades 
and Systemic Risk 
     
No. 11  Nicole Branger, Holger Kraft, 
Christoph Meinerding 
How Does Contagion Affect General 
Equilibrium Asset Prices? 
     
No. 10  Tim Eisert, Christian Eufinger  Interbank network and bank bailouts: 
Insurance mechanism for non-insured 
creditors? 